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The role of stocks in influencing 
the prices of storable commodities 
has long been recognised. For 
example, the Commonwealth 
Government's Year Book for 1939 
states "The collapse in the price of 
wheat which occurred between 
1928 and 1931 was chiefly due to 
the accumulation of stocks in 
exporting countries" (p.618). 
On the other hand, widespread 
unfavourable weather conditions 
for wheat and wool production or 
a rapid increase in demand or a 
rundown in stocks or some 
combination of these changes, can 
cause prices to jump suddenly. For 
example, the period of high prices 
for wool and wheat in the years 
immediately following World War II 
were due to the rapid increase in 
demand for these commodities as 
part of post-war reconstruction, 
plus there was an additional 
military demand for wool due to 
the Korean War. Another example 
of very high prices resulted from 
the 1914 drought that affected 
most Australian States. This severe 
Productloo stocks and 
demand 
The answer Ii hiefly in the 
interaction between stocks, 
production and demand changes. 
When weather conditions are 
favourable for wheat and wool 
production in the countries that 
are the major exporters of these 
commodities then the increased 
supply of these commodities onto 
markets usually causes a fall in 
their market price. In these 
situations where the supply of 
wool or wheat is high relative to 
demand, it becomes relatively 
cheap to buy and store the 
commodity. If these stockholdings 
are large enough then they in tum 
depress prices. These low prices 
ensure that storage remains 
attractive and hence low prices 
tend to persist from year to year. 
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For wheat, very high prices were 
recorded in Western Australia in 
the decade following World War II 
and other years of high prices 
were 1915, 1921, 1937 and 1974 and 
1975 (see Figure 5). For wheat and 
more especially for wool there are 
long periods when prices are fairly 
low or moderate and in these 
periods price changes between 
years are not dramatic. Then there 
are often brief periods of very high 
prices. Why is this the pattern of 
price movements ? 
In Western Australia since 1906 
very high wool prices have been 
observed for only a small number 
of years in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, and high prices have 
occurred in 1924, 1925, 1973, 1974, 
1988 and 1989 (see Figure 4). A 
study of Victorian wool prices 
from 1885 until 1969 suggests 
sharp but brief booms in wool 
prices are expected about once in 
30 years. 
higher price, yet there are brief 
periods of very high prices. 
Viewing historical prices 
( especially for wool) reveals there 
are fairly long periods of relatively 
low prices and much briefer 
periods of very high prices. 
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Figure J. A bell· 
shaped 
distribution of 
prices. 
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However, analyses of wool and 
wheat prices reveal that their 
distributions, particularly for wool, 
are not the typical bell-shape. 
Rather their distributions are 
skewed (see Figures 2 and 3). 
There is a greater chance of 
receiving a lower price than a 
Historical prices 
A conventional view of commodity 
prices is that they follow a bell- 
shaped distribution (see Figure 1). 
In such a distribution most prices 
received by the farmer are close to 
the average or mean price and the 
farmer has an equal chance of 
receiving a price higher or lower 
than the mean price. 
Historical information about 
wool and wheat prices can 
help farmers to plan and 
manage their wheat and wool 
production. Ross Kingwe/1 
describes some management 
lessons derived from 
analysing wheat and wool 
price movements. 
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However, more often farmers will 
have little anticipation of a price 
spike and less knowledge about 
the duration of the spike. 
The decisions made by a farmer in 
these periods of high prices and in 
the immediately subsequent years 
can greatly affect the future 
viability or prosperity of their 
business. Hence, one lesson from 
the history of price movements for 
wheat and wool is that a farmer 
can greatly affect his prosperity by 
capitalising on the limited number 
of very favourable price years he 
will experience as a farmer. 
Because these windows of 
opportunity do not last long, often 
decisions will need to be made 
sooner rather than later and 
tactically rather than strategically. 
Although when a pronounced 
rundown in stocks occurs, then a 
farmer might prepare strategic 
farm plans to capitalise on the 
increased likelihood of higher 
prices often associated with lower 
stocks. 
Implications for 
management 
The nature of the price 
distributions for wheat and wool 
with their infrequent price spikes 
mean that in the lifetime of a 
farmer there may be only a handful 
of years when prices are markedly 
high. These years are unique and 
provide a farmer with a brief 
'window of opportunity'. Some 
farmers will be fortunate to 
experience favourable seasons 
when they also receive these high 
prices. Others will experience the 
high prices when seasons are poor 
or mediocre. Nonetheless often the 
profits a farmer earns in these high 
price years act as a store of wealth 
that the farmer can draw upon in 
subsequent leaner years. 
real prices for meat by 9 per cent. 
Hence the price trend experienced 
by many farmers will cause them 
to increasingly rely on research, 
innovation, technology, 
sustainable practices and 
management improvement as a.. 
means of maintaining farm profits 
in the face of a continued 
downward trend in prices. 
Occasionally, against this trend, 
price spikes will occur. 
Since the 1950s real prices for 
wheat and wool have declined. The 
International Food Policy Research 
Institute is predicting that between 
1990 and 2020 real prices for 
cereals will fall by 19 per cent and 
Underpinning and influencing the 
interaction of production. stocks 
and demand is a host of factors. 
Among these factors are exchange 
rates, the income status of 
purchasers. research and 
technology innovation. prices of 
substitutes and tariff and subsidy 
policies in exporting and importing 
countries. All these factors interact 
to influence the real price received 
by farmers for their wheat and 
wool. 
Occasionally a price spike 
associated with a run down of 
stocks is interpreted wrongly as a 
lasting increase in demand for the 
commodity. This is what seemed 
to have happened for wool when 
the Minimum Reserve Price was 
increased from 508 c/kg in 198&- 7 
to 870 c/kg clean in 1988-9 (an 
increase of more than 70 per cent). 
Those responsible for setting the 
floor price appear to have made 
the classic error of interpreting the 
temporary price spike, caused by 
Figure 3. Detrended real wool prices (c/kg greasy). 
drought led to virtually no wheat strong demand and a stockout, as a 
being available for export from pronounced permanent structural 
Australia in 1915. The low shift in demand. 
production and low stocks, yet 
increased demand from Australia 
and overseas, caused wheat prices 
to increase sharply. 
Price (dkg greasy) 
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Figure 2. Detrended real wheat prices. 
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For further lnformadon contact 
R09I Kiagwell OD (08} 9368 3225. 
Farmers now don't need only to 
sell after harvest or shearing. They 
can sell their production while it's 
growing and sell it in many 
different ways to capitalise on 
price spikes. For example, in 1996 
farmers fortunate enough to sow 
early could have sold a portion of 
their potential crop, immediately 
after planting, for around $215 per 
tonne. By contrast a pool return 
equivalent price of the traditional 
method of selling after harvest 
seems likely to return to farmers a 
price around $190 per tonne pool 
return. So 1996 typifies the brevity 
of a price spike and is an example 
of how farmers well before harvest 
could have capitalised on high 
prices. This example, however, 
does not imply that selling early is 
always the best strategy for 
capitalising on a price spike. It 
illustrates how flexibility in the 
time of selling can provide 
opportunities not previously 
available to capitalise on brief 
periods of high prices. 
Cllil"ent..famling:is.tt\at. '"'"""' .. ,-... 
farmers now can respond to high 
price years by using selling 
methods that were not available a 
decade or more ago. Traditionally 
farmers produced wheat and wool 
which was delivered to selling 
agents. Farmers' education, advice 
and skill equipped them to be very 
competent at production. But now 
farmers need to be competent at 
production and selling, or at least 
they should employ advisers who 
can inform them about when and 
how to sell their wheat and wool 
to either reduce the price 
uncertainty they face or to 
increase the likelihood of 
receiving a high price. 
2000 
Besides the decisions made during 
the price spike, decisions made in 
the years immediately subsequent 
to the price spike also are 
important. Sometimes the high 
profits earned in years with very 
favourable prices lull some 
farmers into a false belief about 
the profitability of agriculture. 
Expensive purchases of land and 
machinery can subsequently 
prove to be unwise. For example, 
following the commodity price 
spike of the mid-1970s land and 
machinery purchases were 
common. Poor seasons, more 
typical prices and very high 
interest rates saw many farmers 
Jabour, and the amount and timing 
of sheep sales, purchases and 
shearing. 
Accordingly most farmers will be 
limited in their response to the 
very high prices. Land use 
decisions in previous seasons or 
borrowing restrictions will limit a 
farmer's ability to react to the 
favourable price years. A rapid 
switch in the farm's enterprise mix 
is usually not possible. Besides, 
investing in a large switch in 
enterprise mix will prove unwise if 
the weather-years during the price 
spike are unfavourable or if the 
brevity of the price spike 
significantly reduces the return on 
the capital purchased as part of 
the enterprise switch. Hence, most 
of the less risky yet profitable 
decisions will be tactical ones 
regarding stocking rates, crop 
areas, fertiliser and herbicide 
rates, selling options, casual 
Figure 5. Real wheat prices ($/tonne). 
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Figure 4. Real wool prices (c/kg greasy). 
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